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into the phrase what he feels to be the noblest thought of his own mind.

But in spite of these limitations the book brings out the heart and essence of Talmudic teaching more truly and helpfully than any other work known to the present writer. Above everything else, it sets forth the convictions of a modern Jew upon important ethical questions. These convictions are so noble in their lofty universalism, so fused with the warmth of a genuine religious sentiment, so eminently worthy of careful consideration, that they cannot help to serve not only the cause of Judaism, but, what is more, the cause of humanity. The translation is in the main good. But it would have been safer to let Ovid's *nitimur in vetitum* alone than to render it "we strive against the forbidden."

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THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE MORAL LIFE. By Wilhelm Wundt, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Leipsig. Translated by Margaret Floy Washburn, Ph. D., Warden of Sage College in Cornell University.

This volume contains a translation of the third and fourth parts of Wundt's "Ethik," from the revised German edition of 1892; and it concludes the work. The two volumes containing translations of the first two parts, were reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. VIII, No. 3, (April, 1898), pp. 382-390. There is no need to repeat what was then said concerning the success of the translation.

The historical review of ethical theories in Part II (Vol. II of the translation) led to a distinct formulation of the main problem: ethics postulates a relation between the individual and the social will, in which each maintains its independent significance. This relation must be explained "in such a manner as to satisfy our modern scientific requirements" (Vol. II, p. 189); and the author intimates that an examination of this question forms the subject of the constructive portions of his work, contained in the volume before us.

The third part of the original treatise, which begins the present volume, is entitled "The Principles of Morality." It opens with

an analysis of the place of Will in mental life. A brief but vigorous attack on the notion of Will as a special "faculty," is followed by a defence of the "autogenetic theory," which considers that the Will has been developed, but "in this development, the complex result has proceeded from simple elements of a like nature with the result itself" (13). Wundt's conception of consciousness here seems essentially the same as that of Professor James Ward; and the analysis of voluntary action corresponds to this point of view. The irreducible active element is called "Apperception." One would like to know what is the relation of this doctrine to that of the last edition of the "Physiologische Psychologie."

We then come to a section (the most important in the book) on the Individual and the Social Will. Historically, the Individual is the later product (27). We find Individuality where "the whole inner life of man appears as his own creation; where for good or evil he regards himself as the originator of his own thoughts and emotions, and of all the outward consequences that may flow from them" (21). But though the material is *his own* possession, it is not his *peculiar* possession. The Individual is social because all may have ideas, feelings, volitions that are identical in content (23; 33). And thus there comes to be a real General Will, which (although the Individual Will is real) is more fundamental, and determines the Individual Will more than it is determined by it. On the other hand, the Social Will lacks the power of self-conscious concentration on a definite end; and "the individual will that appropriates the ideas and tendencies which govern the whole, and brings them to self-conscious operation in its own activity, does more than merely fulfill the social will; it gains the power to stamp society with its own characteristic and individual features" (34). The two elements are "forever separated in the phenomenal world" (37), but may be conceived as united in the Ideal which is the Absolute. This invites comparison with Mr. Bradley's doctrine of the relation between "Self-sacrifice and Self-realization;" and it suggests the same question: unless they can be *shown* to be united *in some degree* in the phenomenal world, can they be "conceived" as united in any other world? Wundt says that the history of opinion on this matter shows that "the conclusions of Ethics cannot be formed without a metaphysical conception of man's psychical life as a whole" (31). There is implicit in his treatment a fundamental metaphysical

principle of this kind (see below), which ought to have been placed in the forefront of the discussion.

The section on the Freedom of the Will includes a discussion of "Psychical and Mechanical Causality," which may possibly leave the reader more than ever in doubt as to what Wundt's view on this matter really is (ch. i., p. 44). On the general question of Freedom, his view approximates to that of T. H. Green, that the essential elements of moral freedom are, Causality by Character (where character means simply the self as moral), and the capacity for rational deliberation. The "indeterminist doctrine" originated with "scholastic nominalists and theological Utilitarians" (53). The usual "short way with the indeterminists" is to ascribe their doctrine to philosophic incapacity; Wundt goes further, and insinuates that it implies a certain moral and spiritual *dullness*, if nothing worse! Not much profit can come of this sort of thing. Men like Martineau and Lotze maintained the "indeterminist" doctrine because by no other interpretation could they justify certain *ethical facts* which perhaps may be summed up by the term "moral responsibility." And they attempted to justify these facts by a metaphysical theory: not (as Wundt and many others suppose) by "denying causality," but by making the will into an Absolute Cause, absolute, but acting only through the phenomenal contents of mind. In Hegel's words (in his *Dialectic*) it is an attempt to affirm "causality" without "reciprocity." The phenomenal motives, etc., are essentially related to the Will (which on this theory is the same as the Self); but the Self, as Will, is capable of absolute causal action; and therefore of absolute responsibility. There seems no ethical objection to such a view; but its scientific and metaphysical difficulties are sufficiently great. There are some who think that, in spite of Green's brilliant discussion, it is not possible (in the present state of our knowledge) to combine the ethical advantages of Libertarianism and the scientific advantages of Determinism, as Green and Wundt attempt to do.

The unsatisfactory discussion of Freedom is followed by an instructive and luminous analysis of that sand-heap of a term, "Conscience" (pp. 59 ff). Full justice is done to the fact, which English writers of the experiential or evolutionary school seem constitutionally incapable of recognizing,—that the gradual formation of moral laws as conscious motives, implies throughout the

conception of something that *ought to be*; and no mere history can account for this.

In ch. ii. we come to the question, How may ethical theory ascertain and establish the "moral ends" which it is to formulate? The method is similar to that of Socrates and Aristotle (76). "The first problem is to answer the question, What ends are universally recognized by our judgment as moral? . . . There is little variation, even during long periods of time, in men's judgments as to what shall be called moral; and within a given stage of moral development, these judgments are hardly less constant than those which deal with logical relations" (77). The results to which this leads are as follows. The object of the moral will cannot be my own self, or any peculiarly individual end; and if not my own, then (with equal reason) not any other in distinction from my own. Utilitarianism is only extended egoism (79). Altruism has ethical value (1) as a sign of character, (2) as a means to further ends, which are given by the Social Will. These originate in the common rational life of humanity; they react to elevate the individual "by producing new objective values or richer content through the creative force of the individual psychical life" (83). But moral life is not exhausted in social life; the ends of humanity transcend those of organized society (86). In fact, Wundt's fundamental principle is a metaphysical one,—the most fundamental dynamic source of social and moral evolution consists in the constant striving of consciousness after a fuller realization of its life. Hence he speaks of "the inexhaustibility of the creative power of mind"; "its essential nature consists in its creative functions" (85). As soon as the significance of this principle is grasped, the attitude taken by Wundt on most problems of ethical theory is seen to result from it. I cannot doubt that the principle is sound and of great importance. In neglecting it, English writers have neglected what is most fundamental in the moral life. It appears, in a peculiar metaphysical setting, in the Ethics of Green and his followers.

Passing by ch. iii. ("Moral Motives"), which includes an elaborate discussion of the theory of punishment, we come in ch. iv. to a critical classification of moral "norms." This is an ambiguous and unnecessary term, and the use of it facilitates a certain blurring of the distinction between moral laws (to be obeyed) and moral ideals (to be realized). With Wundt, "norms" are

practically equivalent to what English writers call moral laws (as distinct from the laws of the State), being based directly on the fundamental moral ends (150). The last part of the chapter is occupied with a discussion of Law in the political sense. Law is "the sum total of all those various subjective rights and duties which the moral will of society, the creator of law, ensures as rights to itself and its subordinate individual wills, in order to the fulfilment of certain purposes; and imposes as duties, in order to the protection of the rights in question" (178). The purposes here referred to go far beyond what is required for the mere maintenance of conditions necessary to the life of society. But Wundt has not the least intention of giving a "collectivist" turn to the conception, and seeking to identify the State, the creator of law, with the nation by a complete democracy. His ideal seems to be that of "paternal government" as exhibited at present on a great scale in the German Empire. And when in Part IV., ch. iii., he comes to deal with the State as "Financial and Economic Community," as "Legal Community," as "Social Unit," as "Association for the Advancement of Culture," it is hard to see what place is left for the Individual Will; while the Social Will has disappeared behind the machinery of government. Wundt's ideas on these subjects can hardly find a congenial home in the Anglo-Saxon mind.

In his concluding chapter, the author works out in a very interesting way the conception of International Law, "which, extending its influence far beyond its origin, is beginning to unite all civilized states into a higher form of legal community" (288). The essential difference between the international and the single community is that international law cannot get beyond the stage of international *custom*. It is impossible to conceive any social will of the international community controlling the individual will (289, 291, etc.). Hence it is the height of irrationality to take moral ideas, whose meaning lies entirely in their relation to the social will of an organized community, and use them as ready-made tests to settle complex questions of international action. There can be little doubt that Wundt is right in looking to the development of what he calls the international commonwealth to put an end to war. Meanwhile, the fluctuating evolution of the commonwealth of nations is a source of grave perplexities and dangers.

The translators deserve the gratitude of all students and teachers of Ethics for making this valuable and suggestive work more accessible to English readers.

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AUFGABEN UND ZIELE DES MENSCHENLEBENS. Nach Vorträgen gehalten in Volkshochschulverein zu München von Dr. J. Unold. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1899.

Several years ago Dr. Unold published a work, "Grundlegung für eine Moderne Praktisch-Ethische Lebensanschauung (Nationale und Ideale Sittenlehre)," in which he attempted to answer the question, Is ethical conduct, and particularly, is an ethical education of the future citizens of a great commonwealth possible on the basis of a purely scientific conception of the world and of life? The book did not receive the attention and recognition which it deserved. In the present volume the author makes another appeal to a larger public, and takes up the same problem in a series of seven lectures and an appendix, discussing the following topics: Past and Present; The Age of Science, Life-Ideals; The Health and Efficiency of the Nation; The Highest Ends of Human Life; Eudæmonism; Objections to Eudæmonism; The Utilitarian Conception of Life; Outlines of a Future National Education.

The thoughts which Dr. Unold expresses and the manner in which he expresses them, stamp him as a man of high ideals, practical common-sense, and literary taste. Both books are valuable contributions to the solution of a highly important problem, and ought to find a wide circle of readers, particularly the last one, which is presented in such popular and interesting form as to make it intelligible to every sensible individual. The writer's thought is somewhat as follows:

The modern civilized nations are about to pass from the period of naïve, instinctive activity, under the guidance of custom and authority, to a period in which they must govern their lives in accordance with reason and freedom, and realize their destiny with consciousness. In order to be able to do this, they must know the purposes or ends to be realized, and choose the proper means of realizing them. Supernatural revelation cannot acquaint the modern man and the modern nations with these ends